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Bonaventure's work on memory is drawn from his work on the Soul's
Journey to God. In the third chapter he writes "on Contemplating God
through His Image stamped upon our Natural Powers" (Bonaventure, 79).
Contemplation requires that the heart leads and the intellect follows. In this
way a growth in understanding may lead us to a greater love than we had
ever dreamed of achieving (Bonaventure, 56. Prologue to SJG).
Bonaventure's intent, and mine, is that we may learn from ourselves as
images of God in our human nature. Thence our relationship with our
Creator may become more secure and peaceful for realizing the moment of
our creation in its memorized actuality.
In order to encourage depth to our thinking, I have presented material
from John McDowell on the contact and involvement of the human mind
with the world in which we live. This work, though from an adult
perspective, throws light on the condition of babes in the womb and
children in their development. Gopnik et al. draw our attention to the
computational state of children 's minds, which is quite clear from their
research. Their work admonishes us to respect the developing conceptus
more than past generations did in this regard. The human being is a great
person from conception to adulthood and beyond.
There are eight headings under which I aim to unfold some
appreciation of this greatness.
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I. Memory - A Power of the Soul and Its Activities
Bonaventure nominates the three great powers of the soul as memory,
intellectuality, and will (Bonaventure, 81). The first named is the most
important for the present discussion. He invites a self-reflection to see that
the soul loves herself, and this could not be unless she knew herself, which
she could not do unl ess she remembered herself. (Loc. cit. , 81).
Memory acts in three ways:
A: By holding and displaying items "present, corporeal and temporal" as
well as "successive, simple and eternal things."
Immediately we can see that the past is a recall while the present is
received and the future is held in foresight. Memory presents as an Image
of Eternity by recalling the past, present and the future, which three require
an eternity definition "whose indivi sible presence extends to all times"
(Ibid.). Thus the created instant of temporality shows us the instantaneous
reality of eternity, which is si mple and without division, endless and
without begi nning, by virtue of its qualitative value when measured against
the temporal. A quantitative argument is inconclusive, to say the least.
B. We hold also simple principles from memory.
Otherwise, we could not remember the things we do. These include
the instant from and for time, the point from and for the line and the unit
which is from and for quantity (Ibid.). Our memory, as we reflect, shows us
holding such clear matters as the discrete and the continuous, with these
being of spiritual derivation since they do not enter through the portal s of
the senses by images from the senses. Bonaventure reckons this knowledge
as being "from above." What he means by this is found in hannony with hi s
thought of the immutable light th at shines on our memory.
C. There are also principles and axioms from our sciences that are "everlast-

ing truths held everlastingly."
As, for instance, the whole is greater than the part, or something
cannot actually be and not actually be at the same time, the principle of
contradiction. When these are first heard they are instantly recognized, not
as something new or as something to be memorized, but as something
obvious as if innate and necessary. Thus we may see that these
unchangeable truths are caused to be remembered by an immutable light
(Ibid.).
Without memory we would know nothing and would be unable to
develop a second nature.
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II. Second Nature and the Moment of Coming to Be
As the very name suggests, nature in its self-reflection in a being
capable of consciousness of herself, requires a second nature by selfdevelopment. It is the moment of conception when this begins. The
spiritual and material components meet in the mutuality of need. The
creation of soul takes place when the gametes fuse and then instantly the
soul embraces the material given for bodily formation . This is the moment
of coming to be which is the event marki ng the begi nning of a new human
life. The mutual destruction of the gametes as li ving identities by their
gametic fusion provides the material (Gillian, 39).
The soul has the qualities of being integrated within itself and also of
being able to integrate other aspects of life to itself. These are required so
as to bring life and order into the dead material which is the remnants of the
two gametes. These gametes are destroyed in their one-cell status of being
alive by their coming together in fusion. Their individuality is destroyed.
The new human soul is both modified and enabled to develop by the
experience in which it becomes a new human being by embracing and
animating the material from the fused gametes. The soul's communicating
capacity, the spirit, is active from conception (Loc. cit. 33).
So, too, must be the intellectual spiritual capacities that the soul
possesses, especially the memory capacity which will be considered
presently. The new soul's experience involves a minimal empiricism
through its immediate contact with the bodily material. In the soul's case
the creative moment for her also involves light, as is clear.

III. Living Spiritual Communication
This communication is a living one and is part of experiencing life
and developing the self in relationships from its inception. Spirit is not
simpl y a presence, which can imply non-communicative activity. Rather,
spirit is an active presence from conception, touching others and the world.
The continuity of a human being's existence and, concomitantly, her reality
and contact with the world as real, begi ns in the mother's womb. She is also
in contact with her mother and with other humans as being recognizably
similar human beings. Should we choose to ignore the reality of our first
moment of existence as being less active than any other moment of our
living, our self-continuity would be undermined to the point of genuine and
frightening uncertainty.
What is being touched on here is the fascinating question of the
moment of coming to be in the human experience of life. This entails
recognition that the beginning of life is an experience both within the
spiritual actuality of the integrated and integrating soul herself and, at the
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same time, empirical in the coming together of the spiritual and material in
a new human being.
What is buried in the spiritual memory is not some hopeful
speculation of a simple pietistic outlook. but something strongly suggested
by the work done by Gopnik et a1. presented in their book, How Babies
Think . At birth we possess certain abilities, amongst which is the "drive to
explore and experiment" upon the totality of creation and its hidden
wonders and ways. In lieu of a tabula rasa, babies possess their own mind
content, and the mind 's own workings (Gopnik, 3).
We are born with " innate knowledge, powerful learning abilities, and
unconscious tuition from adults." Gopnik asserts that these three powers
are important in exploring the difficulty met in understanding the minds of
other people and that thi s process is in train prior to birth (Ibid. , 25).
Bonaventure strongly supports innate knowledge (Bonaventure, 81).
The spiritual communication amongst parents, unborn children and
previously born siblings has the capacity to bring about a speedy
recognition after the birth . The newborn and siblings do have a prior
spiritual experience of each other and build on thi s. Early recognition by
siblings was simply deemed by "experts" as wishful thinking in previous
generations (Gopnik, 26). New developmental research, beginning c. 1970
(Op. cit., vii), shows that "babies and young children think, observe and
reason (Op. cit. , 13).

IV. Considering the Adult Mind and Wondering
About the Unborn Conceived Ones
Just pause for a moment and consider that adult operations are to
make up your mind, change your mind and continue to reflect. Then,
hopefully, we grow in wisdom, which simpl y means putting things
together in good order. Then we may see that this whole process must have
been generated and governed by the ongoing being that is integrated and
integrating. Objecting that the brain takes time to form in the womb does
not render the activity of the soul, engaged in its unified and further
developing activity with the gametic material , as being entirely outside
empiricism. Babies feel the womb and experience spirituality. John
McDowell 's theoretical work on concepts is of some depth and a stimulus
to our consideration of what life in the womb may be for the developing
yo ungsters.
It must happen that a judgment made about things that impact on us
in our experience can tell us whether or not we know the real (McDowell,
11). How thi s judgment is made is a different concern. Such things as
parallax elTor and light refractive properties remind us of faults in our
perceptions. Experience itself is of the passive order whether or not we
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may be active in the experience. We are "saddled with content" in our
receiving what the experience presents to us. Experience of the self, in
which existence is palpable and self proclaiming, is a case in point. A
conceptus reacts as a living being and so is spiritually in contact with all
being. As the child develops in the womb its reactions will become
stronger and its learning clearer.
McDowell 's posi tion intimates that all experience is passive and thi s
passivity activates our conceptual capacities (Ibid.). He arrives at this
position by accepting the Kantian endeavor that would dispen se with the
pendulum effect that follows from a twofold view of our interaction with
the world. [n this twofold view, on the one hand, there is an
unconceptuali zed content for us to wrestle with, which McDowell
desc ribes as the "Myth of the Given." On the other hand, the mind is
required to authenticate its content against some mysterious presentation
of the empirical world (Op. cit. , 114). Kant 's insight limps si nce it is
without "a seriously ex ploitable notion of second nature" (Loc. cit.. 104).
McDowell wishes to build on Kant's genius by clinching the
connection of our living selves to our world, with "exercises of capacities
that belong to spontaneity as elements in the course of life" (Ibid .. Ill).
Such spontaneity is peculiarly human as it involves our human freedom.
Without spontaneity, your own self is not in view, and you know it is in
your view. Neither would our world be in view while your experience tells
you that it is in your view (Ibid. , 114).
Our experience mediates to us as to how things are by acting as a
testing judge for our thought. Hindsight illustrates this ability. This is
necessary if our cogitating is to be valued as reflecting the real inasmuch as
this is available to us. We must at least begin here and thi s is what
McDowell means as a " minimal empiricism" (Op. cit. , xii). Spontaneity,
then, reacting to the event of experience, stimulates our spiritual capacities.
These include our freedom , memory and intellectuality which would
include conceptualization.

V. Our Freedom and Our Will
There is the impOltant distinction that clarifies our freedom as human
beings, which is the distinction that differentiates between free choice and
free will. Thi s must be taken into account. Free choice is in the spiritual
realm and is defined as "a distinctive and habitual spirit th at frees a
man"(Bernard, 24), while the will is a "rational movement that governs the
senses and the appetites" (Ibid., 25). Without a free choice we could be
neither just nor unjust. Our conceptual capacities are brought into play by
what exp·erience presents to us, so that conceptual content is automatic and
not a matter of choice (McDowell , 10). By way of clarification we may
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look upon free choice as a spiritual necessity even like window-shopping
the creation, while free will is concerned with our moral responsi bility.
Bernard is more concerned with our internal freedoms than with mind
formation but our living freedom , our loving in life and mind formation are
all involved . Loving and being loved is Bernard 's paramount concern. "I
love because I love; I love in order to love" (2 Bernard, 205*)
McDowell is in concert with thi s approach. He recognizes that
"responsible freedom" provides the context for the exercise of the
conceptualizing abilities that are part of spontaneity. The interlocking mesh
that provides the conclusions of our thinking to present them to us is not
beyond our control in terms of further self-development or simple
correction (McDowe ll, 12). McDowell is certainly concerned with the
operation of concepts as mediating the relationship that ex ists between the
human mind and the world and the various relations involved (Loc. Cit., I).
This di stinction, within freedom , of an habitual free choice operating from
within us on creation should help us to grasp the begi nnings of life and
living.

VI. Intellectuality and Its Work in Reflection
Intellectuality's function is to " understand the meaning of terms,
propositions and inferences" (Bonaventure, 81). For the present we may
reflect that we build our understanding by using universal terms, then more
universal terms and finally the most universal terms, such as dog, animal,
and living thing or being. More deeply or prior to this it is most necessary
that we understand what a being is and then what is "being per se" (Ibid.).
Just as we need to know the most universal term so as to understand the
least uni versal, as in dog, animal and living thing, so without a knowledge
of being per se we cannot know any substance at all. We also must know
the properties of being, which are the three convertibles, One, true and
Good. Existence is the most basic good since without it there is nothing at
all. Good in turn must be one or is incomplete and so less than good. Good
also must be true or else it is not simply good. Similarly Truth must be One
to be true. This leads us to further considerations.
We are invited to consider whether or not we can know anything
defective without knowing what is completely and absolutely perfect. Of
course, without anything perfect our knowledge of the imperfect or
defective would not stand, since we could not measure it without a
standard. Being in potency, for instance, is known against the reality of
being in act. To see being itself as an abstract concept standing alone is not
the place to stop thinking, for to do that would make thought the
completion of a circle and so fail to reach a standard in actuality.
August, 2004
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Being in potency is know n against being in ac t. Hence any analysis
would not be complete without kn owing Being that is most pure, most
complete and absolute, totall y reliable and beyond di spute, or simpl y Pure
Act. In all knowing and understanding, therefore, we are actuall y knowin g
God. Thi s is necessary, and important for us to reali ze, because God would
then be seen to be underwriting everything and would answer to being
One, True and Good.

VII. Reflection and the Power of Memory
When we refl ect w ithin ourselves on our co ming to be, given the
power of memory, there should be found so me ev idence within the self of
the moment of thi s happening. Such evidence suggests light and is an
immedi ate knowledge of the self, which is not so mething that a fellow
hum an being can give to another but whi ch is an intuitio n that is quite
certain since it is based on the self's own experi ence of herself. The
buildup of evidence results in th e greater celtitude of a perso n's selfestablishment and offers a source to which a person may return . It is like
returning to reengage with the light th at shines on the memory and to
wonder about this light and what it implies . Thi s is no mea n implication .
Remember that the "very idea of experi ence is the idea of something
natural and that empiri cal thinking is answerable to ex peri ence"
(McDowell xix).

VIII. Conclusion: Seeing God Obscurely as in a Mirror
Refl ecting on the mo ment of coming to be yourself as yourself
requires simple attention to the moment which should be fo und in your
spiritual memory. That recall , in Bonaventure's ex position, puts yourself at
the source of your life. Thi s does not seem to be a traum ati c memory, but
rather a gentle recall of something incomplete as a beginning would
suggest. The memory has a light present to it (Bonaventure, S I). He invites
us to see ourselves, "and you will be able to see God through yourself as
through an image" as "through a mirror" somew hat obsc urely (Op. cit. ,

SO).
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